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Round Table Discussion
Rolling back malaria: action or rhetoric?
The Roll Back Malaria Initiative (RBM) is a partnership of countries with endemic malaria, United Nations agencies,
bilateral development agencies, the research community, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations,
foundations, and the media. The participants see it as the beginning of a societal movement to bring malaria under
control.
The RBM partnership was formed in response to the realization that current efforts to combat malaria are
disproportionate to the enormous burden this disease places on health and development in poor countries. The
objective is to halve the malaria burden in countries participating in the initiative.
The technical strategy of RBM is adapted from the one formulated in 1992 at the Ministerial Conference on
Malaria in Amsterdam. It is based on the early detection and prompt treatment of malaria cases, the detection and
control of malaria epidemics, mosquito control, and the prevention of malaria in pregnancy.
The principal mechanism RBM will use to achieve its objectives is national action intensified by a global
partnership within which regional and local partnerships focus on malaria control in the context of health sector
development. Technical support networks provide the information and expertise that enable these partnerships to
take effective action.
RBM also supports research on the development of better tools for prevention and control. Its main concern is
to reduce the massive toll of malaria deaths in Africa, but it is global in its scope, and recognizes the burden malaria
imposes on endemic regions throughout the world.
For optimists and pessimists alike, RBM raises big questions. Most of them concern the science, the strategy,
the statistics and the money involved.
. From a purely technical standpoint, are the necessary tools available, particularly for tackling current problems
such as parasite resistance to drugs and mosquito resistance to insecticides? Are new drugs forthcoming? Are not
alternative insecticides to DDT prohibitively expensive?
. RBM aims to strengthen health systems and is thus a horizontal rather than a vertical programme. Can a
horizontal programme deal with a single disease such as malaria?
. RBM aims to halve the malaria burden, but do accurate measurements of that burden exist, and if not, how will
RBM’s performance be assessed?
. Many of the conditions that favour malaria will be difficult or impossible to eliminate. They include poor,
marginalized, largely inaccessible communities; increasing numbers of countries ravaged by conflict and without
basic social and health infrastructures; environmental changes that facilitate malaria transmission and cause
epidemics, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic which is undermining capacity in tropical Africa. What chance has RBM to
fulfil its objectives in the face of these obstacles? And how does it propose to meet the increasing costs of malaria
interventions in poor endemic countries?
Keywords: malaria, prevention and control; cost of illlness; health plan implementation, methods; national health
programmes; Africa south of the Sahara.
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Malaria control stymied in 2010,
mastered in 2025
Joel G. Breman1
Are the tools available? In one sense yes: the develop-
ment of artemisinin and other compounds to
supplement the current use of chloroquine, pyr-
imethamine/sulfadoxine, tetracycline, mefloquine,
quinine, primaquine and related drugs would provide
effective therapy. But are these drugs readily
accessible at low cost to all who need them? No!
Insecticide-impregnated bednets decrease overall
childhood mortality, acquisition of parasitemia and
other malaria-related indices, at least in the short run.
But are they available and accessible at low cost to the
populations living in endemic areas? No! Are other
satisfactory tools (vector-targeted and immunologi-
cal interventions) available and accessible to decrease
severe illness and transmission? No — but research
will bring them closer.
Can Roll Back Malaria be a horizontal programme
and deal with a single disease? Not with maximum
effectiveness: most ‘‘horizontal’’ programmes try to
1 Deputy Director, Division of International Training and Research,
Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, Bldg 31,
Room B2C39, 31 Center Drive, MSC 2220, Bethesda,
MD 20892–2220, USA (email: jbreman@nih.gov).
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do too much for too many with too few resources.
While strengthening health systems in developing
countries is imperative, the best way to achieve that
goal is to combat the diseases that cause the greatest
burden, and to do it with tenaciously focused efforts.
With success in combating one important disease,
credibility and confidence are gained for dealing with
all diseases. HIV/AIDS is so pervasive in Africa that
its management must be considered when dealing
with every disease. For example, if there is wide-
spread distribution of sulfamethoxazole/trimetho-
prim to prevent opportunistic infections in HIV/
AIDS patients, there may be accelerated develop-
ment of P. falciparum resistance to sulfadoxine/
pyrimethamine.
Do accurate measures of the malaria burden exist?No!
Lack of accurate measures will make it exceedingly
difficult to measure success. Process, outcome, and
impact measures are needed urgently, nationally and
internationally (1, 2). When programmes begin, basic
epidemiological data should be collected on the
following:
– patients admitted to hospitals (total, with malaria
and anaemia);
– patients dying in hospitals (total, with malaria and
anaemia);
– percentage of patients properly and promptly
managed in hospitals and peripheral health units
(this includes assessment of clinical and laboratory
diagnoses, treatment, health education and referral);
– percentage of low-birth-weight babies born in
urban and rural areas, and percentage of newborns
in hospitals with and without maternal and
placental malaria. Such data are essential indices
for every malaria programme. As programmes
mature, other important measures can be added,
focusing on events in rural areas and on disease
sequelae.
What chance has RBM of fulfilling its objectives?
Scenario 1. It is 2010. Over 80% of the population in
every village in malarious areas of Africa are sleeping
under insecticide-impregnated mosquito nets every
night. Fever clinics with effective antimalarial drugs
exist within 5 km of 80% of the villages. Eighty per
cent of all villages have a village health worker with
major responsibility for management of malaria
patients. Data on fever, laboratory-diagnosed malar-
ias, and other malaria indices are sent electronically to
each nation’s capital and RBM centres monthly. The
data are analysed, sent back to the field monthly in
newsletters, and used for programme planning. At
least 20% of malaria control resources available
within countries and internationally are used for
training, programme monitoring and laboratory,
clinical and epidemiological research. Ministries of
Economic Development, Defence, Science & Tech-
nology, Education and others are working closely
with the Ministry of Health to control malaria. The
Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM), which aims
to build up research capacity in developing countries,
is catalysing increasing support. Phase III (commu-
nity-wide) field trials of malaria vaccines are being
completed: one vaccine candidate shows great
promise for protecting very young children and
pregnant women. International and national leaders
of malaria control programmes have four priorities:
to manage by pursuing specific objectives; to support
staff in the field; to tell the malaria control story
clearly, creatively and often; and to attract support.
Ten African countries show that malaria is
being controlled. In these countries, childhood
deaths, anaemia patients admitted to hospitals and
low-birth-weight babies are 15–35% lower than in
2000. Integrated management of sick and well
children is now occurring at all fever clinics.
On the other hand, another 20 countries show
that the incidence of malaria has increased since 2000.
This is because 25–50% of ‘‘malaria cases’’ are now
being reported compared to the 1–5% when
programmes began in 2000. It now seems that the
strategy of patient management, selective treatment
and chemoprophylaxis during pregnancy, bednet
distribution and epidemic containment will have little
long-term impact on transmission. Every developed
country continues to have importations of malaria;
some have thousands of cases yearly. High profile
politicians are urging citizens and organizations to be
more actively involved in supporting malaria re-
search, training and control in developing and
developed countries for humanitarian and economic
reasons. The most popular musical artists and other
celebrities appear worldwide in support of malaria
control and research. ‘‘Mash Malaria Marathons’’ are
becoming widespread. No one is speaking of ‘‘a
societal movement in health’’.
Scenario 2. It is 2025. Over 90% of persons in
ruralmalarious areas are sleeping under long-duration
insecticide-impregnated bed nets and using insecti-
cide-impregnated clothing, and soap with effective,
non-toxic, insect repellents. Several new, low-cost,
antimalarial drugs have replaced chloroquine and
pyrimethamine-sulfadoxine as first-line therapy.
Vector control methods (mix of residual house
spraying, larviciding, environmental management)
are being used in all cities and 90%of the rural areas in
malarious countries: control of other vector-borne
diseases occur concurrently with decreased malaria
through Africa. Some countries are testing second
and third generation malaria vaccines. Improved
genetic understanding of mosquitoes, parasites, and
human susceptibility to malaria have resulted in field
trials of other new treatment and prevention
interventions. Patients with fever and malaria, and
malaria-associated deaths, have decreased by more
than 40% in every malarious country as a result of
well-administered programmes and the benefits of
economic and educational progress. The number of
importedmalaria cases in Europe andNorthAmerica
has decreased by 90% since 2000, despite evidence
that only one in 2–5 cases was reported at that time to
national and international health authorities in
developed countries. The newly licensed malaria
vaccines are expensive, and coverage is less than 15%
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but rising rapidly. The company with the vaccine
patent cedes it to the UNMalaria programme, which
has now become part of UNITED, the UN Initiative
to Eliminate Diseases. n
1. Bryce J et al. Evaluation of national malaria control programmes
in Africa. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 1994,
72: 371–381.
2. Remme JHF, Binka F, Nabarro D. A framework and indicators
for monitoring Roll Back Malaria. American Journal of Tropical
Medicine and Hygiene, 2001, in press.
Roll back malaria in sub-Saharan
Africa?
Wenceslaus L. Kilama1
The malaria situation in sub-Saharan Africa is grim,
and the disease now constitutes a leading cause of
poverty accounting for annual losses of up to
US$ 12 000 million.
Malaria control activities in Africa peaked
during the 1960s, when, according to eradication
trials, 60% of the African population could be
protected, mainly by means of DDT. Efforts at
malaria eradication were abandoned in 1969. Later,
malaria surged. In 1992Ministers ofHealth produced
the Global Malaria Control Strategy which empha-
sized early diagnosis and prompt treatment; other
measures were named but hardly implemented at all.
The Roll Back Malaria (RBM) initiative is merely a
redefinition of the 1992 strategy with partner
involvement added on. A critical examination of
the initiative is essential.
Malaria eradication trials relied on very power-
ful tools, namely DDT and chloroquine which are
now both problematic. Countries with high resis-
tance to chloroquine (such as Kenya, Malawi and the
United Republic of Tanzania) have banned its use,
and others will follow suit. Resistance to pyimetha-
mine/sulfadoxine, its logical successor, is already
rampant in East Africa, and is likely to spread fast and
widely across sub-Saharan Africa. The observed
susceptibility to amodiaquine is probably transient
and the drug is not so safe. The remaining
antimalarials are costly and have limited safety for
wide use.
DDT proved its prowess during the 1960s
despite isolated reports of DDT resistance. Now
DDT is threatened by an internationally binding ban
advocated mainly by environmentalists. Pyrethroids,
which are the mainstay of the RBM strategy, are
already threatened by resistance in the two leading
African malaria vectors, vizAnopheles gambiae andAn.
funestus. Resistance inAn. gambiae is mainly promoted
by use of pyrethroids in agriculture. In KwaZulu
Natal a switch from DDT to pyrethroids allowed a
return of An. funestus which is now pyrethroid-
resistant. Resumption of DDT spraying has effec-
tively controlled An. funestus. The lesson to be learnt
from this is that flexibility in the choice of insecticides
would containmalaria. In neighbouringMozambique
pyrethroid-resistant An. funestus is delaying the
commissioning of a billion dollar aluminium smelter.
The genes which foster pyrethroid resistance are
probably widespread; and resistant populations will
result from wider use of these chemicals.
Malaria in sub-Saharan Africa is complex
because the vectors, parasites, geography, ecology,
human behaviour, infrastructures and resources
available for disease control are all variable and
problematical. Control strategies must therefore be
place-specific. Some questions will illustrate the
point. Will insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) work
where the vectors are resistant to pyrethroids or are
exophilic? Is there evidence to support ITN promo-
tion in urban areas? To what extent will antimalarial
drug resistance interfere with malaria control? Will
imposed cost sharing deny treatment and prevention
to the poor who in many countries of sub-Saharan
Africa constitute over half of the population?
Several reports show scarcity of malaria
research capacity in sub-Saharan Africa; malaria
control personnel are even rarer. Many countries
have some control personnel in national capitals, but
have none at district and peripheral levels where
controlmust actually be carried out.Whowill lead the
control activities? Who will undertake the applied
operational and field research that is essential for
guiding and steering the control programmes? Is
there applied field research support from the RBM
Secretariat?
Given the complexity of the malaria problem,
is it rational to delegate its control to general health
services, whose few personnel are poorly trained,
underpaid, overworked and ill-equipped? Will they
properly diagnose and promptly treat malaria which
might soon be multidrug-resistant? Will they under-
take field applied and operational research, decide on
and undertake appropriate vector control, implement
health education targeted at the particular needs of
the local situation? Would vertical malaria control
integrated within improved health care systems do
better?
At the Amsterdam Conference in 1992,
countries in which malaria is endemic, together with
major donors and multilateral organizations, pro-
mised to reinvigorate malaria control. Almost a
decade and over 10 million deaths later, the donors
have not made sufficient input, and the malaria
situation has deteriorated considerably. What is
needed now, at the global and African leadership
level, is to translate platitudes and promises into
concrete and visible inputs into malaria control
programmes. Promises have been made in the past
but often not met. When met, donors however little
they know about malaria control, often insist on
specifying exactly what donations should be spent
1 Chairman, African Malaria Vaccine Testing Network, C26/27
Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology Building, Ali Hassan
Mwinyi Road, PO Box 33207, Dar es Salaam, United Republic
of Tanzania (email: wkilama@africaonline.co.tz).
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on. To make this concern effective rather than
counterproductive, will donors agree to subject
malaria control proposals to independent, external
multidisciplinary review following scientific norms?
Will African governments for a change invest
substantially in their national malaria control pro-
grammes?
Malaria control in sub-Saharan Africa is
‘‘doable’’ IF there are effective tools, capacity
strengthening, field applied research, adequate fund-
ing, better programming and management of malaria
interventions. n
Malaria – first, roll back expectations
Brian Greenwood1
Rolling back malaria is a daunting task. The relatively
easy part has been done and, with a few exceptions,
malaria has been controlled effectively in areas close
to the outer limits of its endemicity. Achieving
similar success in the many parts of the world where
the infection is still a major health problem,
especially in Africa, is going to be much more
difficult. The problem of malaria control in Africa
lies in part in the efficacy of the major malaria vectors
and in part in the lack of resources to support control
programmes.
Controlling malaria in areas where residents are
bitten nearly every night by at least one infected
mosquito is a formidable challenge. Drugs, vaccines
and insecticides will have to be enormously effective
if they are to reduce transmission in such areas and
reduction of the illness caused by infection may be
the best that can be achieved for some time.
Establishing a basic programme of control that
might, for example, include effective treatment,
prevention of malaria in pregnancy and provision of
insecticide-treated materials cannot be achieved for a
cost of less than US$ 3–5 per person per year. Thus
the cost of a modest malaria control programme for
Africa alone is in the range of US$ 1000–2000 mil-
lion per year. Where is this enormous sum to come
from? Some of it will be contributed directly or
indirectly by the affected population, as is the case at
present, but outside funds will be needed, especially
for the poorest countries of Africa. Maintaining
support from the international community for the
long haul needed may not be easy but the
Onchocerciasis Control Programme is an example
of a situation in which this has been achieved.
Because of the technical difficulties and cost of
implementing malaria control it is important that
expectations of what can be achieved in the next
decade or so through the RBM initiative are not
raised too high. The target of a reduction in mortality
of 50% by the year 2010 is an ambitious one.
How much progress has the RBM initiative
made towards achieving its objectives during its first
two years? Staff of the programme must have been
faced with some difficult decisions during the
planning stage. Should they go for a few quick
successes that would encourage the donors to
maintain funding or should they concentrate on
raising the profile of malaria internationally and
building up a solid partnership? They have taken the
latter course and the initiative has obtained sub-
stantial publicity for malaria through events such as
the Abuja summit, and it has built up a broad-based
partnership.
Taking this course has, however, led almost
inevitably to complaints in some malaria-endemic
countries that not much has changed on the ground
since the initiative started. This situationmust change
during the next two to three years if the credibility of
the initiative is to be sustained. Consequently, some
objective measurement of its success will be needed.
Documenting the impact of a successful malaria
control programme is not easy and the RBM team has
invested substantial resources in working out ways of
measuring both performance and outcome indica-
tors, an investment whose value will become
apparent when specific programmes have been
started. The implementation and evaluation of
malaria control programmes require trained staff,
and such staff are woefully few in many malaria-
endemic areas. Rolling back malaria will not be
achieved unless the capacity for research in malaria
and for malaria control is increased substantially,
especially in Africa.
Because of the difficulties in controlling malaria,
it is unreasonable to expect immediate, dramatic
successes in all areas where the infection is endemic. A
sensible approach may be to concentrate activities in a
few countries where malaria is a major problem but
where there are some circumstances that favour a
control programme, such as political commitment to
malaria control, and political stability. Objective
success in such situations would provide enormous
encouragement to those involved on the ground in
malaria control, to the donors and to those working in
communities where control is more difficult. n
Roll Back Malaria: technically
feasible or just politically correct?
Pierre Druilhe1
Who could be opposed to Rolling Back Malaria? The
idea in itself is not new, however. The real question is:
why should it succeed now where it has largely failed
in the past? The outcome of attempts to eradicate
malaria in the past through the widespread use of
insecticides has been essentially to select out anophe-
1 Professor of Tropical Medicine, London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street, London WC1E 7HT, England.
1 Head, Biomedical Parasitology Unit, Institut Pasteur, 28 rue du
Docteur Roux, 75015 Paris, France (email: druilhe@pasteur.fr).
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line mosquitoes that are resistant to the most
affordable insecticides. Later attempts to reduce
malaria illness and deaths by improved access to
treatment have selected out parasites that are
resistant to the most affordable drugs. The current
attempt to employ the few remaining tools might
complete the eradication of the armamentarium
rather than the enemy.
The long-term vision is clearly deficient. The
history of malaria control is characterized by under-
estimation of the problem and inability to grasp the
fact that the situation is not static but constantly
evolving. Host–parasite interactions lead to subtle
equilibria (with distinct steady states in different
regions of the world) which will unavoidably be
modified as a consequence of any intervention. This
in turn implies that without real-time monitoring in
order to adapt control tools and without research to
develop tools for the future years, theremight be little
hope.
A practicable control strategy against any
infectious disease has to be based on knowledge.
How much do we know about malaria? Mortality
figures suffer from massive standard deviations: the
estimate of 1million deaths a year in the 1950swas re-
evaluated to twice as many before the emergence of
any drug resistance. The only well-documented
study, on the impact of chloroquine resistance alone,
concluded that it increased mortality by a factor of 8.
Everyone hopes that it may not be as bad as that
globally, but no one knows. Data about resistance to
this and other antimalarials are obtained by a variety
of hardly comparable methods; in addition they are
very scarce and, for most of the time, out of date.
Consequently, decisions about the next drug to use
are somewhat erratic. Other issues have not been
seriously faced. For instance, themedium-term effect
of impregnated bednets on local epidemiology has
been put in doubt by some studies. Likewise, it is
merely ‘‘hoped’’ but not known that combined
therapies would reduce the emergence of resistance.
Disconcertingly, obtaining reliable information on
these points does not seem to be amongst the current
RBM priorities.
To revive interest in the control of malaria,
RBM has chosen a high profile. The horizontal
approach to strengthening heath systems is innova-
tive, modern and ambitious. It could make national
decision-making the dominant force in a country
rather than Northern-driven decision-making, and
thus has political and health implications that go far
beyond malaria. The federation of all public and
private, national and international funding agencies is
commendable, as the field is highly disorganized.
Provided that conflicts of national interest can
be overcome for the sake of a great cause, the main
bottleneck from the donors’ point of view remains
confidence. They need confidence first that WHO
can deliver (for once), second that the managers
involved can form an efficient enough strategic team,
and third that the undertaking is truly feasible, given
the severe shortage of effective tools.
RBM’s claim that it can halve the malaria
burden in the medium term is reminiscent of the
claim made by the UNDP/World Bank/WHO
Special Programme for Research and Training in
Tropical Discases (TDR) in 1976 that it could
develop a malaria vaccine within 5 years. Since
malaria mortality is hardly measurable and no effort
to measure the real impact of the tools is planned, the
RBM intiative could inspire as much trust from
donors as the proclamation of ‘‘Health for all by the
year 2000’’ did in 1978. A better way to to attract
serious confidence and contributions would be to
propose a realistic strategic plan based firmly on what
is known about the means available.
What is obviously missing is prospective
studies, which means research, but not the research
that is currently being carried out. Here are some
examples of the type of research and activities
needed:
– to establish a link between existing research and
control teams, which would enable both parties to
work effectively;
– to monitor critical parameters in pilot areas from
the outset;
– to find out how to rescue the efficacy of previous
tools (chloroquine resistance is reversible) or at
least preserve existing ones, which seems both
pragmatic and affordable;
– to devise better tools for the future, which are
indispensable for any real and sustainable impact.
An investment of 1% of the total RBM budget in
‘‘research for control’’ (a huge amount by normal
research standards) would still leave 99% of the
budget to spend on the uncertain operations
currently planned.
To end on a note of optimism: the fact that
WHOhas sought sceptical views to publish in its own
journal is in itself a promising step in the right
direction. n
Roll Back Malaria is unarguably both
necessary and possible
David Nabarro1 & Kamini Mendis2
The Roll Back Malaria movement arose from two
basic realities. First, the large and growing burden of
malaria in the world today is grossly inconsistent with
modern health standards, and receives far too little
attention. Second, malaria, despite all the scepticism
expressed in this round table, is unarguably a disease
that can still be both prevented and treated
effectively. The vast majority of people who get
infected with malaria and die of it — the poor of this
1 Executive Director, Director-General’s Office, World Health
Organization, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland.
2 Senior Adviser, Roll Back Malaria Project, World Health Organization,
Geneva, Switzerland.
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world — do so because they do not have access to
existing tools and interventions. These facts on their
own would amply justify the RBM objectives,
together with the logic that, provided we continue
to develop a reserve of effective technologies for
preventing and treating malaria, its incidence can be
reduced.
This being said, the task of turning the
possibility into reality presents daunting challenges,
some of which have been clearly expounded in this
round table. RBM’s very foundations consist in
understanding and responding to them. No one,
surely, would argue against doing so, especially as we
know that much can be achieved with the available
technologies. We will briefly comment on the five
main concerns expressed.
First, there is the overarching one of themassive
cost entailed in rolling back malaria. Critics doubt that
it can be met. Much of RBM’s early efforts have been
aimed at making people aware of malaria as a health
and development problem and in doing so, enlisting
the support of the world’s major development
partners and political leaders for the RBM effort.
An RBM-commissioned study on the macro-eco-
nomics ofmalaria provided a sound basis onwhich to
make the case for a greatly increased level of global
investment. Substantial pledges of financial resources
for malaria control have been made by G8 countries,
the European Commission, development banks and
other organizations, and they approach the very large
sums that will be needed. The task now is to develop
mechanisms to ensure that these increased resources
can be used effectively. This is the key to obtaining
more.
Second, many technical impediments, espe-
cially resistance to drugs and insecticides can compromise
the tools available for malaria control. Will RBM not
destroy the weapons rather than the enemy? The
answer, surely, is not to safeguard the tools at the cost
of disease and death, but to tackle these impediments
in a technically rigorous manner, with adequate
research and development. Some strategies for
delaying the development of resistance to anti-
malarial therapies are known and are firmly backed
by RBM partners. The development of new drugs is
being fostered through the Medicines for Malaria
Venture, an alliance between the public sector and the
pharmaceutical industry. RBM supports a larger
investment in research and development than has
possibly ever been made before — certainly much
more than the 1% of the global investment that has
been suggested here. There have always been
concerns about the complexity of tackling malaria;
they point quite rightly to its need for a powerful
technical foundation. WHO will work with other
RBM partners to ensure that strategies pursued and
programmes supported conform to the most up-to-
date evidence and experience. Where they do not,
WHO will call for changes.
Third, local capacity for malaria control is usually
inadequate. In most countries RBM partners support
activities that are carried out within poorly resourced
health care systems. Extra investment is needed to
build this capacity in ways that bring essential
interventions to poor people. WHO, together with
other RBM partners, has established regional net-
works of technical experts. They use the results of
research and field experience in dealing with malaria
alongside other health problems associated with
poverty such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
maternal and child ill-health.The action will be taken
forward through sector-wide approaches to health,
intersectoral development, the work of nongovern-
mental organizations and assistance to communities
affected by conflict and complex emergencies.
Fourth, critics say that nothing new appears to
have been added by RBM to the global strategy for
malaria control drawn up in 1992. In reality, though,
what has been added are the elements that will make
this strategy work: coordinated action by develop-
ment agencies, hence the emphasis on partnership;
concerted action by groups at community level,
hence the emphasis on popular movements; and
consistent application of the technical principles
formulated in 1992, hence the emphasis on evidence-
based action. Higher expectations will increase the
availability of resources. A focus on action at country
level will make it possible to apply the global strategy
to regional and local epidemiological realities.
Commitment to strengthening the health system will
eventually lead to sustainable outcomes. As we have
seen, greater investment in research and develop-
ment is needed to back the effort up. Roll Back
Malaria supports the application of well-accepted
malaria control strategies within countries, between
countries and internationally.
Fifth and lastly, what is the wisdom of the
horizontal approach to disease control? At its inception,
RBM set out to strengthen the extremely weak health
systems that prevail in most situations where malaria
occurs. Since malaria is one of the greatest health
problems faced by communities, effective action to
roll it back will strengthen frail health systems. Poor
people will thus become better able to obtain
essential medications, vital health care and preventive
measures, and to benefit from effective surveillance
systems. National and local roll back malaria move-
ments will help health systems to focus on outcomes.
We would not be making the effort to help
countries and communities roll backmalaria if it were
an easy task. The RBM partners know that many
difficulties lie ahead. Experience tells us that these
can be tackled by applying science, human and
financial resources, and effective organization. Most
important, though, is recognition of the need to
oppose the suffering and deprivation caused by
malaria. n
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